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Federal Pension Benefits: The Reach
of Preemption
By Marsha N. Cohen*
John and Jane Doe have been married for thirty years; for the first
twenty of those years John worked for a railroad. During the ten years
since John retired from that job he has been receiving railroad retire-
ment benefits. John and Jane have lived frugally since John's retire-
ment, paying all their living expenses from their income other than the
retirement benefits.
John and Jane have invested John's retirement benefits in stocks
and real estate, and used some of it to make the down payment and
monthly payments on a modest automobile. Although the stock and
real estate investments were small when made, they are now valued at
three to five times their cost.
John and Jane are now divorcing. Their only significant assets in-
clude John's right to his retirement benefits, and the stock, real estate,
and automobile purchased with the retirement benefits he has received.
The United States Supreme Court ruling in Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, I
upholding federal preemption, 2 prevents Jane from receiving any inter-
est in John's right to receive retirement benefits, regardless of her rights
under state marital property law. The Hisquierdo Court did not deter-
mine the appropriate disposition of the car, the stock, and the real es-
tate, all property purchased with the pension funds.
What if John and Jane's assets came from other federal pension
plans? The United States Supreme Court held in McCarty v. McCary
3
that under the doctrine of federal preemption states could not divide
military retirement pay. Although the Supreme Court has not ruled on
the issue, four California court of appeal cases are in agreement that
* Associate Professor of Law, Hastings College of the Law, University of California.
B.A., 1968, Smith College; J.D., 1971, Harvard Law School. The author gratefully acknowl-
edges the research assistance of Gail Mautner.
1. 439 U.S. 572 (1979).
2. The federal preemption doctrine emanates from the supremacy clause, article VI,
clause 2, of the United States Constitution.
3. 453 U.S. 210 (1981).
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federal preemption precludes state court division of social security ben-
efits.4 Congress has mitigated the probable preemption result in regard
to social security by creating a legislative exception for marriages of ten
years' duration.5 In August 1982, Congress virtually negated the im-
pact of McCarty by giving the states express permission to divide mili-
tary retired pay in accordance with state marital property laws.6 The
applicability of state marital property laws to other federal pension
plans has either been upheld or has not become an issue.
7
The judicial pronouncements concerning preemption of the right
4. In re Marriage of Hillerman, 109 Cal. App. 3d 334, 167 Cal. Rptr. 240 (1980); In re
Marriage of Cohen, 105 Cal. App. 3d 836, 164 Cal. Rptr. 672 (1980); In re Marriage of
Nizenkoff, 65 Cal. App. 3d 136, 135 Cal. Rptr. 189 (1977); In re Marriage of Kelley, 64 Cal.
App. 3d 82, 134 Cal. Rptr. 259 (1976).
When the Hillerman case first reached the court of appeal, the court reached a contrary
conclusion. On January 16, 1979, it held that the trial court should have retained jurisdic-
tion to divide the social security benefits. 88 Cal. App. 3d 372, 151 Cal. Rptr. 764, 770
(1979), vacated, 109 Cal. App. 3d 334 (1980), reprinted in 6 COMM. PROP. J. 145 (1979).
Hisquierdo was decided by the United States Supreme Court on January 22, 1979 and the
court of appeal ordered its own opinion withdrawn from publication on February 9, 1979.
88 Cal. App. 3d 372. On April 12, 1979, the California Supreme Court granted a petition for
hearing and retransferred the case to the court of appeal for consideration in light of Hir-
quierdo. 151 Cal. Rptr. 764 (1979).
Practitioners have generally viewed the right to receive social security as nondivisible,
as reflected in the Hisquierdo case. Neither party claimed that Angela Hisquierdo's expecta-
tion of receiving social security was community property and the superior court ruled that it
was not. Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. at 579. The issue was not raised on appeal. In
re Marriage of Hisquierdo, 133 Cal. Rptr. 684 (1976).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 416(d), amended by Pub. L. No. 95-216, § 337(a), 91 Stat. 1548 (1977).
See infra note 70.
6. Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 97-252, 96 Stat.
730 (1982) (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 1408) (hereinafter cited as Former Spouses' Act).
7. There are 68 federal retirement plans, Ginzberg, The Social Security System, 246
Sci. AM. 51 (January 1982), of which the Civil Service Retirement System, 5 U.S.C. §§ 8301-
8348 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980), with 2,700,000 covered employees, is the largest. Women and
Retirement Income Programs: Current Issues of Equity and Adequacy 52 (Subcomm. on
Retirement Income and Employment, House Select Comm. on Aging, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1979)). Each is created by its own statute; the question of federal preemption of division of
benefits by state law would need to be separately analyzed for each plan. There are similari-
ties among the statutes setting up the various pension plans, and some of their features are
shared by social security.
Numerous cases had upheld the division of future civil service retirement benefits prior
to a statutory change which specifically allowed garnishment for purposes of property divi-
sion. See infra note 29. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Peterson, 41 Cal. App. 3d 642, 115
Cal.Rptr. 184 (1974), overruled on other grounds, In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838,
851, 544 P.2d 561, 569, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633, 641 (1976); Kim v. Kim, 618 P.2d 754 (Hawaii
Ct. App. 1980); Hughes v. Hughes, 96 N.M. 719, 634 P.2d 1271 (1981); Valdez v. Ramirez,
574 S.W.2d 748 (Tex. 1978); Adams v. Adams, 623 S.W.2d 500 (Tex. App. 1981); Schafer v.
Schafer, 3 Wis. 2d 166, 87 N.W. 2d 803 (1958). See generally Reppy, Community and Sepa-
rate Interests in Pensions and Social Security Benefits after Marriage ofBrown and ERISA, 25
(Vol. 34
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to future receipt of railroad retirement and social security benefits and
of military retired pay are unequivocal. This Article therefore exam-
ines the Hisquierdo and McCarty decisions and the four California
court of appeal cases concerning preemption of division of social secur-
ity benefits to determine their application to assets existing at the time
of divorce that were received from, or are traceable8 to, those federal
sources. It concludes that the preemption of division of received rail-
road retirement and social security benefits does not automatically fol-
low from the decided cases. Were the McCarty decision still effective,
it would have been far more difficult to reach the same conclusion
about received military retired pay. The legislation reversing McCarty
requires amendment, however, to assure the full applicability of state
law to received military retired pay. This Article analyzes the legisla-
tive reversal of McCarty, suggesting that congressional action should
go further in clarifying the division of assets acquired with military re-
tired pay and that legislation should now be passed to allow railroad
retirement benefits and social security benefits to be fully divisible
under state law.
Although Hisquierdo and McCarty both arose in California, a
community property state, their doctrines affect property division in all
states, regardless of the state's marital property system. Thus this Arti-
cle's conclusions concerning the applicability of state law affect issues
that might arise in any state.9 The final section of the Article focuses
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 417,435-38, especially note 75 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Reppy, Commu-
nity and Separate Interests. ]
The Internal Revenue Service has ruled that no conflict exists between community
property laws and the Civil Service Retirement Act and that, for purposes of income tax
treatment, benefit payments thereunder should be considered community property to the
extent earned during the marriage. Rev. Rul. 168, 1963-2 C.B. 9, 10. In the same set of
rulings the IRS stated that community property treatment would also be accorded to mili-
tary retired pay attributable to services performed when the married member of the Armed
Forces was domiciled in a community property state. Rev. Rul. 169, 1963-2 C.B. 14. The
IRS also indicated it would accord community property treatment for tax purposes to recipi-
ents of social security retirement benefits domiciled in community property states at the time
they become entitled to receive the benefits. Rev. Rul. 167, 1963-2 C.B. 17.
8. Acquisitions during marriage in California are presumptively community property.
A spouse may rebut this presumption by tracing the purchase price of an acquisition to an
item of separate property. H. VERRALL, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CALIFORNIA COMMU-
NITY PROPERTY 147 (3d ed. 1977); see, e.g., Freese v. Hibernia Say. & Loan Soe'y, 139 Cal.
392, 394, 73 P. 172, 173 (1903).
9. The Washington Supreme Court rejected an argument that community property
states which render a "just and equitable" rather than "equal" division are not bound by
Hisquierdo. In re Marriage of Larango, 93 Wash. 2d 460, 463, 610 P.2d 907, 908 (1980).
Montana, a common law marital property state, also followed Hisquierdo, declaring that
railroad retirement benefits could no longer be considered part of the "marital estate." In re
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narrowly on California law suggesting that states may have alternative
bases for jurisdiction over assets that might otherwise be considered
nondivisible under federal preemption analysis.
Background on Division of Federal Benefits
Litigation on the subject of marital rights and federal retirement
benefits has focused upon the right of a nonemployed spouse' 0 to share
future benefits from various federally provided pension systems. The
value of that right is frequently considerable, justifying the expense of
litigating the issue. In contrast, no court has seriously considered the
divisibility of pension benefits already received from the three federal
sources examined in this Article and still on hand at the time of di-
vorce. Divorcing couples may well possess assets received as, or tracea-
ble to, social security or railroad retirement benefits or military retired
Marriage of Knudsen, 606 P.2d 130, 131-32 (Mont. 1980); see also Eichelberger v. Eichel-
berger, 582 S.W.2d 395, 401 (Tex. 1979).
States with both community property and common law marital property systems antici-
pated the decision in McCarty and held that Hisquierdo prohibited the division of future
military retired pay. See, e.g., Cose v. Cose, 592 P.2d 1230, 1232 (Alaska 1979), cer. denied
446 U.S. 933 (1981); Russell v. Russell, 605 S.W.2d 33, 35 (Ky. 1980), cert. denied 453 U.S.
922 (1981); DeDon v. DeDon, 390 So. 2d 937, 940 (La. App. 1980), a id 404 So. 2d 904
(1981) (post-McCarty).
Other jurisdictions declined to divide military retired pay on the theory that it is not
"property" under the applicable state law because the interest is defeasible. See infra note
68. See, e.g., Paulsen v. Paulsen, 269 Ark. 523, 526, 601 S.W.2d 873, 875 (1980); Ellis v.
Ellis, 191 Colo. 317, 319, 552 P.2d 506, 507-08 (1976); Hiscox v. Hiscox, 385 N.E.2d 1166,
1168 (Ind. App. 1979); Hill v. Hill, 47 Md. App. 460, 469, 424 A.2d 779, 783 (1981) (dis-
cusses, but does not rely on, supremacy clause argument), a'd, 436 A.2d 67, 70 (1981) (post-
McCarty); Witcig v. Witcig, 206 Neb. 307, 315-16, 292 N.W.2d 788, 793 (1980); Baker v.
Baker, 421 A.2d 998, 1000 (N.H. 1980) (discusses, but does not rely on, supremacy clause
argument); Baker v. Baker, 546 P.2d 1325, 1326 (Okla. 1975).
In the two years between the Hisquierdo and McCarty decisions, a number of state
courts examined the supremacy clause argument as it applied to military retired pay and
held that there was no preemption. These cases were no longer good law after McCary.
See, e.g., Czarnecki v. Czarnecki, 123 Ariz. 466, 600 P.2d 1098 (1979); In re Marriage of
Milhan, 27 Cal. 3d 765, 613 P.2d 812, 166 Cal. Rptr. 533 (1980), vacated 453 U.S. 918
(1981); Cuttitta v. Cuttitta, No. 80-1469, certiorari to the Court of Appeal of California,
Fourth Appellate District, judg. vacated, 453 U.S. 918 (1981); Linson v. Linson, I Hawaii
App. 272, 618 P.2d 748, 754 (1980); In re Marriage of Musser, 70 Ill. App. 3d 706, 709-10,
388 N.E.2d 1289, 1292 (1979); In re Marriage of Schissel, 292 N.W.2d 421, 424-27 (Iowa
1980); Rogers v. Rogers, 401 So.2d 406, 409 (La. App. 1981); Karr v. Karr, 628 P.2d 267, 275
(Mont. 1981),petition for cert. filed, No. 81-363, August 24, 1981, 454 U.S. 890; In re Mar-
riage of Miller, 609 P.2d 1185 (Mont. 1980),judg. vacated, 453 U.S. 918 (1981); Trahan v.
Trahan, 609 S.W.2d 820, 823 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980), rev'd, 626 S.W.2d 485 (1981); Gaudion
v. Gaudion, 601 S.W.2d 805, 808 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980).
10. For purposes of this Article, "nonemployed spouse" means that spouse who did not
personally earn the pension in question, even if otherwise employed.
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pay. In many cases the unused sums would be small. However, if
those benefits were converted into property, stock or other assets which
have appreciated in value, their division may be of considerable
significance. '
Division of marital property under community property systems
has as its hallmark the recognition of the nonemployed spouse's inter-
est in the financial gains of both spouses during the marriage. This
recognition translates into laws in all the community property states,
12
requiring upon dissolution13 equal14 or equitable15 division of the
11. A note on terminology: Both the courts (e.g., "if retired pay were community prop-
erty," McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. at 226) and the commentators (e.g., "So, the benefits
earned by [the husband's] labor during marriage were his separate property," Reppy, Learn-
ing to Live with Hisquierdo, 6 COMM. PROP. J. 5, 7 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Reppy, Learn-
ing]) pose the issue of the treatment by the states of federal retirement benefits as a
classification problem: whether the proceeds are the separate property of the employed
spouse or the community property of both spouses. The issue is not, however, the classifica-
tion of the asset, but the power of the state to grant the asset, regardless of its classification
under state law, to someone other than the employee spouse, the intended beneficiary of the
federal program.
Separate property in California is defined as "[p]roperty owned before marriage or ac-
quired during marriage by gift, will, or inheritance." CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 21; CAL. CiV.
CODE §§ 5107-5108 (West Supp. 1981). All other property acquired during marriage is pre-
sumed to be community property. Property which is nondivisible under Hisquierdo and
McCarty is therefore not separate property in the terminology of the California community
property system, and should not be so called.
During the continued existence of the marriage, occasions may arise when the commu-
nity classification of the asset is of some significance. The Internal Revenue Service may
logically continue to accord community property treatment to income from these pension
sources, notwithstanding that the source of income cannot be divided at divorce. See Rev.
Rul. 169, 1963-2 C.B. 14. A conclusion that these sources are separate property in a commu-
nity property system also has ramifications for the classification of the benefits once re-
ceived. In sum, it is far more accurate, although verbose, to consider the right to receive
railroad retirement benefits as a community property asset that cannot be divided between
the spouses. See Reppy, Community and Separate Interests, supra note 7, at 508.
12. Eight states-Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas,
and Washington-have community property systems, as does Puerto Rico. W. REPPY & W.
DEFUNIAK, COMMUNITY PROPERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 1-2 (1975).
13. The community wealth must be divided upon dissolution of the community either
by divorce or by the death of either spouse. Upon death, the relevant inquiry concerns the
extent of property over which the decedent spouse has testamentary power. In California,
under the "terminable interest" doctrine derived from Waite v. Waite, 6 Cal. 3d 461, 492
P.2d 13, 99 Cal. Rptr. 325 (1972), overruled on other grounds, In re Marriage of Brown, 15
Cal. 3d 838, 851, 544 P.2d 561, 569, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633, 641 (1976), and Benson v. City of Los
Angeles, 60 Cal. 2d 355, 384 P.2d 649, 33 Cal. Rptr. 257 (1963), interests in retirement plans
that are traceable to employment during marriage, althougi recognizably community prop-
erty even if not yet vested, see In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d at 851-52, 544 P.2d at
569, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 642, may not be bequeathed by the nonemployee spouse. See gener-
aly, Reppy, Community and Separate Interests, supra note 7, at 443-82. The terminable
interest doctrine has been applied to federally created pensions. In re Marriage of Fithian,
10 Cal. 3d 592, 599-600, 517 P.2d 449, 453-54, 111 Cal. Rptr. 369, 373-74, cert. denied, 419
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wealth obtained through either spouse's labors' 6 during the marriage.
The marital property laws of most non-community property states now
also recognize the contributions of the nonemployed spouse to the fam-
ily's earning capacity. In almost every state, the concept of equitable
division has replaced both formalities of title and the working spouse's
exclusive control of earnings as the basis for property division upon
divorce. 17
For a division of assets to approach either equality or equity,
whether in a community or non-community property system, all assets
U.S. 825 (1974); In re Marriage of Peterson, 41 Cal. App. 3d at 653-56, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 192-
94 (1974); Bensing v. Bensing, 25 Cal. App. 3d 889, 893-94, 102 Cal. Rptr. 255, 257-58
(1972). All three cases were overruled on other grounds. In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal.
3d at 851 n.14, 544 P.2d at 570 n.14, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 641 n.14. Upon death, the terminable
interest doctrine applies to future pension benefits and it is unnecessary to consider whether
federal preemption, this Article's primary concern, is an obstacle to full community property
treatment of the assets at issue. The statute overruling McCarty enacts the terminable inter-
est doctrine, precluding former spouses from exerting testamentary power over their interest
in their ex-spouses' military retired pay. Former Spouses' Act, supra note 6, § 1002(c)(2), 96
Stat. 730, 732 (1982).
To the extent a decedent's estate includes assets traceable to federal pension benefits
received during his or her lifetime, the terminable interest doctrine is not an obstacle to
community property division. The classification analysis in this Article applies to division of
assets in an estate as well as to division upon divorce. For ease of reference, however, this
Article will refer only to dissolution by divorce, referred to simply as divorce.
14. Equal division is mandated in California, CAL. CIv. CODE § 4800 (West Supp.
1981), but see exceptions, § 4800(b), (c); Louisiana, LA. CIv. CODE ANN. arts. 1290, 1308,
2336 (West 1973 & Supp. 1981), LA. CODE Civ. PROc. ANN. art. 82 (West 1960 & Supp.
1981); and New Mexico, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-7 (1978); Michelson v. Michelson, 86
N.M. 107, 520 P.2d 263 (1974) (the statutory requirement that division be "just and proper"
held to mean equal).
15. Equitable division is mandated in Arizona, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-318 (1976
& Supp. 1981); Idaho, IDAHO CODE § 32-712 (Supp. 1980); Nevada, NEv. REV. STAT.
§ 125.150 (1981); Texas, TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. tit. 1, § 3.63 (Vernon 1975 & Supp. 1981);
and Washington, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09.080 (1981).
16. Assets obtained during marriage through the exploitation of the "time, energy and
skill" of either husband or wife are deemed to be community property. H. VERRALL, supra
note 8, at 4; see W. REPPY & W. DEFUNIAK, supra note 12, at 1. In California, a presump-
tion favors the classification of property as belonging to the community estate rather than to
the separate estate of either spouse. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5110 (West 1970 & Supp. 1981).
17. In 40 common law property states the courts may make an equitable distribution of
property upon divorce. Freed & Foster, Divorce in the Fifty States. An Overview, 14 FAM.
L.Q. 229, 250-51 (1981). General discussions of marital property systems and the movement
to equitable distribution include Bartke & Zurvalec, The Low, Middle and High Road to
Marital Property Law Reform in Common Law Jurisdictions, 7 COMM. PROP. J. 200 (1980);
Greene, Comparison of the Property Aspects of the Community Property and Common-Law
Marital Property Systems and their Relative Compatibility with the Current View of the Mar-
riage Relationshp and the Rights of Women, 13 CREIGHTON L. REV. 71, 97-104 (1979); and
Irish, A Common Law State Considers a Shift to Community Property, 5 COMM. PROP. J. 227
(1978).
declared by a state to be within its marital property system must be
available for division. Federal court decisions that remove entire cate-
gories of assets from that division preclude the effectuation of the prop-
erty division policies of the states. The number of people affected is
significant. The Hisquierdo decision continues to have an impact on a
large number of people;' 8 McCarty would have affected many more if
not legislatively reversed. 19 Social security is the largest of all federal
pension plans, 20 so its status in regard to the applicability of state mari-
tal property laws21 has the greatest impact of all.
Case Law on Division of Received Federal Benefits
The United States Supreme Court's decisions in Hisquierdo and
McCarty unequivocally prohibited state division of future railroad re-
tirement benefits and military retired pay in accordance with any state
laws giving the nonemployee spouse a share of the employee's entitle-
ment. Although the Supreme Court has not ruled on the issue, Califor-
nia courts, which generally have upheld the applicability of community
property concepts to other types of federal benefits, 22 have concluded
18. Railroad workers are covered by the Railroad Retirement System, 45 U.S.C.
§§ 231-23 It (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). Nationwide there are 448,400 employee annuitants of
the Railroad Retirement Board, of whom 33,900 reside in California. In addition, 234,000
employee spouses nationwide are Board annuitants, of whom 17,100 reside in California.
The Board indicates that the data on spouse annuitants understate the number of married
employee annuitants. Letter from Maynard I. Kagen, Director of Research, Railroad Re-
tirement Board, to Marsha N. Cohen (Dec. 3, 1981) (on fie with the author).
19. Retired military personnel are covered by the Uniformed Services Retirement Sys-
tem, 10 U.S.C. §§ 3911-3929 (Army), §§ 6321-6332 (Navy and Marine Corps), §§ 8911-8929
(Air Force) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). On September 30, 1980, there were 1,264,525 recipients
of military retired pay (including disability retired pay) nationwide. Of these, 190,593 have
their benefits mailed to California addresses. No information is available on the number of
beneficiaries who are married. Letter from Colonel F.A. Schrader, Director of Compensa-
tion, Military Personnel & Force Management, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense,
to Marsha N. Cohen (Nov. 23, 1981)(on file with the author).
20. As of December 30, 1978, there were 18,357,755 recipients of old-age benefits na-
tionwide under the Old Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI) program;
1,718,431 Californians receive these benefits. More than 34 million individuals were receiv-
ing benefits of all types under the OASDI programs. 1977- 79 Social Security Bulletin, Annual
Statistical Supplement, at 179.
21. Commentators have assumed that the Hisquierdo decision forecloses the division of
future social security benefits. See Reppy, Learning, supra note 11, at 19; see also Bruch, The
Defnition and Division of Marital Property in California: Towards Parity and Simplicity, 33
HASTINGS L.J. 769, 809 n.156 (1982) (social security disability).
22. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Milhan, 27 Cal. 3d 765, 613 P.2d 812, 166 Cal. Rptr. 533
(1980); In re Marriage of Hisquierdo, 19 Cal. 3d 613, 566 P.2d 224, 139 Cal. Rptr. 590
(1977), rev'd, 439 U.S. 572 (1979); In re Marriage of Fithian, 10 Cal. 3d 592, 517 P.2d 449,
111 Cal. Rptr. 369, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 825 (1974). "IT]he California Supreme Court
refuses to find any federal preemption of a spouse's proprietary rights under the state's com-
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that state law cannot be applied to future social security retirement
benefits. 23 Examination of these cases establishing the indivisibility of
future benefits is necessary to determine whether their rationale also
forecloses division of received assets from the same sources.
Railroad Retirement Pensions: Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo
Railroad Retirement Act benefits, funded by employee and carrier
contributions, were intended by Congress to encourage older railroad
workers to retire by providing them with some financial security and,
as a result, to provide new jobs and advancement for younger workers
in the railroad industry.24 Spousal benefits terminating upon divorce
are also provided for in the Act.
25
The Court in Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo26 began its analysis of
whether to grant Angela Hisquierdo an interest in her husband's "ex-
pectation of ultimately receiving benefits" 27 under the Act by restating
that matters of domestic relations are under state control. When state
family law conflicts with a federal statute, the court concluded that it
has "limited review under the Supremacy Clause to a determination
whether Congress has 'positively required by direct enactment' that
state law be pre-empted. ' ' 28 Further, the Court stated that a "mere con-
flict in words" was not sufficient to override the state law; "[s]tate fam-
ily and family-property law must do 'major damage' to 'clear and
substantial' federal interests before the Supremacy Clause will demand
that state law be overridden. ' 29 The Court's preemption test for family
law matters thus requires satisfaction of two conditions: first, a finding
munity property system absent an express statement by Congress that it intends to deprive a
California married person of his or her property." Reppy, Community and Separate Interests,
supra note 7, at 492.
23. See supra note 4.
24. For a brief description of the Railroad Retirement Act of 1974, its predecessor stat-
utes, and their legislative history, see Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. at 573-77.
25. 45 U.S.C. §§ 231a(c), 231d(c)(3) (1976). The Act makes no provisions for ex-
spouses, in contrast to the Social Security Act. See infra note 70. A proposal to provide for
ex-spouses was rejected in the course of the Act's revision in 1974. See Hisquierdo v. His-
quierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 573 (1979).
26. 439 U.S. 572 (1979).
27. Id. at 573.
28. Id. at 581 (citation omitted).
29. Id (citations omitted). It is interesting that all four prior cases in which the Court
"has found it necessary to forestall . . . an injury to federal rights by state law based on
community property concepts," id at 582, involved inheritance and survivorship rather than
divorce. An argument can be made that because property division at divorce is more central
to state control of domestic relations than property division at death, the most stringent test
for preemption of state law should be reserved for the former. A less stringent test may in
fact have been applied in the four cases cited by the Court.
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of a positive requirement by direct enactment in federal legislation that
the state law be preempted, and second, a finding that the continued
application of state law would cause major harm to clear and substan-
tial federal interests.
The Hisquierdo Court proceeded to find such an express conffict
between section 23 Im of the Railroad Retirement Act, which prohibits
assignment, attachment and anticipation of benefits, 30 and the wife's
right under California's community property system to share in that
portion of the pension earned during marriage.3' The consequence of
any division of the right to receive the pension would be impairment of
the financial security of the employee beneficiary. The result, the
Court explained, would discourage divorced employees from retiring,
fearing they would have to share their benefits. In fact, an incentive to
continue working would exist because income from the divorced rail-
road worker's continued labor would not be a marital acquisition, and
would thus be separate property. This result would frustrate a major
congressional purpose in providing the pension plan.
32
Application of Hisquierdo to Received Benefts
The Hisquierdo Court found that section 23 1m, the anti-attach-
ment clause of the Act, was a direct enactment of a positive require-
ment that state marital property law yield to federal law regarding
division of the future right to pension receipts. The Court concluded
that continued application of state law would harm the clear and sub-
stantial federal interests favoring orderly retirements in the railroad in-
dustry. To determine if a state may divide money already received
30. 45 U.S.C. § 231m (1976 and Supp. IV 1980) provides in pertinent part as follows:
"Notwithstanding any other law of the United States, or of any State, territory, or the Dis-
trict of Columbia, no annuity or supplemental annuity shall be assignable or be subject to
any tax or to garnishment, attachment, or other legal process under any circumstances what-
soever, nor shall the payment thereof be anticipated . See infra text accompanying
notes 33-34.
31. The Court held that this express conflict would exist even if Angela Hisquierdo
were granted community property other than the pension to offset the value of that asset and
make the equal division required under California law; an offsetting award would be an
anticipation of benefits forbidden by section 231m and "would upset the statutory balance
and impair petitioner's economic security just as surely as would a regular deduction from
his benefit check." Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. at 588. See infra text accompanying
notes 44-46. The offset device was used in In re Marriage of Milhan, 13 Cal. 3d 129, 131,
528 P.2d 1145, 1146, 117 Cal. Rptr. 809, 811 (1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 976 (1975), to
circumvent the preemption problem posed by the court's inability to award the nonem-
ployee spouse any interest in the employee spouse's military life insurance policies.
32. Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. at 585. If the worker remarried, the wealth
from continued labor would be a marital acquisition of the new marriage.
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under the Railroad Retirement Act and on hand at the time of divorce,
it is necessary to determine whether section 231 m includes a positive
requirement preempting state law in regard to this category of asset. In
addition, to satisfy the second condition of the Court's preemption test,
the continued division of this category of assets in accordance with
state law must be found to harm clear and substantial federal interests.
Section 23 Im consists of two major prohibitory clauses, each with
a somewhat different emphasis.33 The first clause prohibits assignment
of the annuity, or its subjection to garnishment, attachment, or other
legal process. The second prohibits anticipation of the annuity.
When a state court at the time of divorce divides the right to a
pension between husband and wife, the court has in a very real sense
subjected that annuity to legal process. 34 However, once an annuity
payment has been received, it is unclear whether the anti-attachment
clause continues to apply. Comparison of section 231m with section
407 of the Social Security Act,35 a similar anti-attachment clause, is
helpful because its reach has been the subject of considerable litigation.
The scope of the latter section is broader than its Railroad Retirement
Act counterpart. It refers not just to the right to future payment, but
also quite specifically to "moneys paid" as well as payable under the
law. In contrast, the language of the Railroad Retirement Act anti-
assignment clause seems targeted to protect the corpus of the annuity,
rather than all funds flowing from it. Had Congress wished to protect
Railroad Retirement Act benefits more fully from legal process, it
could have used language of broader applicability similar to that of
section 407.
Even if section 23 lm were found applicable to "moneys paid," like
section 407, and thus to benefits on hand at the time of divorce, the
33. See supra note 30.
34. The Court rejected the argument that because Angela Hisquierdo was a co-owner
of the pension under California community property law, section 231m would not apply. It
reasoned that her inability to use legal process to protect her interest was a "severe limita-
tion" on her ownership. 439 U.S. at 586 n.19. Furthermore, legislation overriding section
231 m to allow garnishment for spousal support claims specifically precludes garnishment to
effect property divisions between spouses. Id at 587 & n.20. In contrast, civil service retire-
ment benefits may be garnished for community property purposes. Id at 590; see 5 U.S.C.
§ 8345(j), (1) (Supp. IV 1980), added, Pub. L. No. 95-366, 92 Stat. 600 (1978). See also supra
note 7.
35. 42 U.S.C. § 407 (1976 and Supp. IV 1980) provides: "The right of any person to
any future payment under this subchapter shall not be transferable or assignable, at law or
in equity, and none of the moneys paid or payable or rights existing under this subchapter
shall be subject to execution, levy, attachment, garnishment, or other legal process, or to the
operation of any bankruptcy or insolvency law." See Reppy, Community and Separate Inter-
ests, supra note 7, at 533 n.416.
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division of those assets between the spouses in accordance with state
law still might not be precluded. If the assets are not "readily with-
drawable," they may be beyond the protection of section 231m and
subject to state law. In the leading case of Phipott v. Essex County
Welfare Board,36 the United States Supreme Court held that section
407 imposes "a broad bar against the use of any legal process to reach
all social security benefits." 37 l. that case the plaintiff county agency
had provided financial assistance to Wilkes, a person eligible for, but
not then receiving, disability insurance benefits under the Social Secur-
ity Act. The board advised Wilkesto apply for such benefits, but, as a
condition for receiving county assistance, Wilkes was required to exe-
cute an agreement reimbursing the county for all benefits received. A
year later Wilkes received a check for retroactive disability insurance
benefits and deposited it into a bank account held by Philpott as his
trustee. The welfare board sued under the reimbursement -agreement
to reach the bank account.
The issue before the Court in Phipott was, the effect of section 407
upon the state's right to reimbursement from Wilkes' account. The
Court held that section 407 protects "moneys paid" 38 as long as they
are "readily withdrawable" and retain the quality of "moneys" in the
form in which they are held.3 9 Therefore, the state was not entitled to
reimbursement from the account. Similar protection has been ac-
36. 409 U.S. 413 (1973).
37. Id at 417.
38. A number of cases decided prior toPhilpto, and one case decided after-Philpott but
neglecting to consider it, held that section 407 does not apply to moneys traceable to pay-
ments under the Social Security Act. These cases are no longer good law. E.g., Owens v.
Owens, 591 S.W.2d 57 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979); Texas Baptist Children's Home v. Corbitt, 321
S.W.2d 610 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959); Ponath v. Hedrick, 22 Wis. 2d 382, 126 N.W.2d 28 (1964).
It is unlikely that two state appellate court cases allowing wives' attachment requests
against social security benefits, notwithstanding section 407, would survive serious scrutiny
after Hisquierdo. These cases distinguished a wife from a creditor on the ground that the
Social Security Act was enacted to protect her as a dependent as well as her husband, the
prime beneficiary. Brown v. Brown, 32 Ohio App. 2d 139, 288 N.E.2d 852, 853 (1972) (hus-
band restrained from negotiating social security check); Huskey v. Batts, 530 P.2d 1375
(Okla. Ct. App. 1974) (future disability benefits divided).
39. Philpott v. Essex County Welfare Board, 409 U.S. at 416. The easiest case factually
is one in which the benefit check is as yet uncashed. Good v. Wohlgemuth, 15 Pa. Commw.
524, 327 A.2d 397 (1974); see also Gilfone v. State of New Jersey, 165 N.J. Super. 186, 397
A.2d 1120 (1979).
Commingling, as that term is used in community property parlance, see W. REPPY,
COMMUNITY PROPERTY IN CALIFORNIA: CASES, STATUTES, PROBLEMS 117 (1980), does not
eliminate section 407 protection if the social security moneys can be easily traced, are readily
withdrawable, and are in a form that has the quality of "moneys." A social security recipi-
ent can lose the protection of section 407, on the other hand, even if the benefits remain
uncommingled.
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corded to money held in checking accounts, 40 and to savings and loan
deposits under analogous provisions of veterans' benefits law.41 This
protection, however, has not been extended to negotiable notes, United
States bonds, 42 or other "permanent investments" such as land and
buildings.43 The form in which received railroad retirement benefits
are held at the time of divorce thus may determine whether or not those
benefits are subject to division under state law.
The second clause of section 23 1m, prohibiting anticipation, seems
factually inapplicable to money already received from the railroad re-
tirement system. The Court's concern with this clause in Hisquierdo
involved the remedy applied in the case of In re Marriage of Milhan.
44
The Milhan court compensated the nonemployee spouse with an offset-
ting award of other community property equivalent in value to her in-
terest in her husband's military life insurance policies. The Milhan
remedy would give the nonemployee spouse assets equivalent to the
actuarial value of the pension at the time of divorce. The Hisquierdo
Court foresaw that the employee spouse would be seriously disadvan-
taged if Congress modified the pension law before benefits were re-
ceived. Similarly, if the employee died or changed jobs the pension's
value would change dramatically.45 However, the "obvious frustration
40. Anderson v. First Nat'l Bank, 151 Ga. App. 573, 260 S.E.2d 501 (1979); Household
Finance Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 91 Misc. 2d 141, 397 N.Y.S.2d 564 (1977); see also
Lawrence v. Shaw, 300 U.S 245 (1937) (taxation of veterans' benefits). The court inAnder-
son followed Philpott and refused to allow a judgment to be satisfied by garnishing a check-
ing account containing judgment debtor O'Kelley's social security disability payments. The
facts are unique. The plaintiffs were family members of O'Keiley's wife and mother-in-law,
of whose murders O'Kelley was convicted and for which he was sentenced to two consecu-
tive life sentences. The plaintiffs' unsatisfied judgment against O'Kelley arose from a civil
suit for the deaths of the two women.
41. Porter v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 370 U.S. 159 (1962). But see Wisconsin
Bankers Ass'n v. Robertson, 294 F.2d 714 (D.C. Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 938 (1961).
42. Carrier v. Bryant, 306 U.S. 545, 547 (1939).
43. Trotter v. Tennessee, 290 U.S. 354, 356-57 (1933). Mr. Justice Douglas suggested
that the test of exemption under section 407 should be "liquidity," which he felt could in-
clude stocks and bonds as well as savings accounts, depending upon the particular facts.
Porter v. Aetna Casualty Co., 370 U.S. at 163-64 (Douglas, J., separate opinion).
The protection from attachment in section 407 has been held by one court as terminat-
ing upon the beneficiary's death. In re Estate of Vary, 401 Mich. 340, 352, 258 N.W.2d 11,
16 (1977). Applying this analysis to the railroad retirement and social security benefits on
hand at the death of a beneficiary spouse, the surviving spouse could argue that the anti-
attachment clauses do not prevent the application of state law marital property principles to
those benefits regardless of the form in which they are held.
44. 27 Cal. 3d 765, 613 P.2d 812, 166 Cal. Rptr. 533 (1980), vacated, 453 U.S. 918
(1981).
45. Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. at 589.
[Vol. 34
of congressional purpose '4 which the Court feared would result in
connection with an entitlement to future receipt of benefits would not
occur if the money were already received and its value fixed and
determinable.
It does not appear, then, that state laws dividing money received
from Railroad Retirement Act annuities still on hand at the time of
divorce would directly conflict with either prohibitory clause of section
23 lm of the Act. The first condition for preempting state marital law, a
positive requirement of preemption by direct enactment, is thus not
met with regard to received benefits.
It appears analytically unnecessary to consider whether the second
condition of the Court's test for application of the supremacy clause is
met, that is, whether the consequences of applying state law would "do
'major damage' to 'clear and substantial' federal interests." 47 Never-
theless, if this second condition cannot be met, the conclusion that the
states may divide received benefits in accordance with their marital
property liw is strengthened.
Accepting the Court's view of the injury resulting from division of
future benefits,48 some injury to federal interests admittedly would flow
from division of received benefits. A major congressional objective in
any pension program is providing for the financial needs and economic
security of the intended beneficiaries.4 9 Although application of state
law to received benefits would in most cases have minor financial im-
pact compared to division of future income from the pension, some
diminution of the assets of the employee spouse would occur. How-
ever, such diminution usually will not be of sufficient magnitude to
constitute the "major damage" required to preempt state law.50
State jurisdiction over received benefits does not impair all con-
gressional objectives for pension plans. Recipients of pension benefits
have already made the decision to retire, a decision intentionally en-
couraged by the railroad retirement program.51 Another objective is
46. Id
47. Id at 581.
48. See supra note 32 & accompanying text.
49. 439 U.S. at 583-86.
50. See id at 581. The unusual case, in which assets of greatly appreciated value can
be traced to money from pension benefits, should not be determinative of the application of
the supremacy clause test. The question to be asked is whether the general application of
state law in an area does major damage to the substantial federal interest, not whether in a
particular case the application of state law leads to a result contrary to the federal interest.
Id.
51. Id at 585.
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the targeting of benefits to the intended beneficiaries. The spouse of a
retired worker covered by the Act is, until the time of divorce, an in-
tended beneficiary, provided for by the spousal benefits.5 2 The division
of benefits received during the marriage, therefore, appears to be in
harmony with this congressional goal.
Analysis of the Court's rationale in Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo indi-
cates, then, that states may apply their marital property laws to re-
ceived benefits under the Railroad Retirement Act. One possible
exception might occur when a recipient has maintained those benefits
in a "readily withdrawable" form; this exception, however, would re-
quire an overly broad interpretation of the language of section 23 lm.
53
The Social Security Benefits
The social security system has been described as "a form of social
insurance ...whereby persons gainfully employed, and those who
employ them, are taxed to permit the payment of benefits to the retired
and disabled, and their dependents." 54 Although characterized as so-
cial insurance, social security also has "some of the attributes of. . . a
private retirement plan. '55
The taxes which fund benefits are based upon the employee's earn-
ings.56 Eligibility for benefits is based upon completion of a certain
number of "quarters" of covered employment. 57 However, "ft]he
amount of an employee's 'contribution' or earnings does not necessarily
52. Id at 584.
53. See supra text accompanying notes 36-43. Professor Reppy distinguishes future
benefits from benefits on hand at divorce "on the theory that state law has no opportunity to
attach and vest a community interest in the wife until the sums are paid out of the federal
treasury." He adds that "the tenor of the Hisquierdo opinion suggests the Court wanted [the
wife] to have no community interest at any stage of the retirement plan process." Reppy,
Learning, supra note 11, at 7 n.4. This author's reading of Hisquierdo does not yield this
tenor. The Court carefully limits its opinion to the "expectation of ultimately receiving bene-
fits," Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. at 573. The Court also stated that "[the] approach
must be practical. The federal nature of the benefits does not by itself proscribe the entire
field of state control," id at 583, indicating that the Court would carefully analyze the distin-
guishable issue of the application of the supremacy clause to received benefits.
54. Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 609 (1960); see also Caughey v. Employment
Security Dep't, 81 Wash. 2d 597, 601, 503 P.2d 460, 462 (1972).
55. In re Marriage of Kelley, 64 Cal. App. 3d 82, 96, 134 Cal. Rptr. 259, 267 (1976).
56. These are called FICA taxes. Federal Insurance Contribution Act (FICA), Int.
Rev. Code §§ 3101-3121 (codified at 26 U.S.C. §§ 3101-3121 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)); In re
Marriage of Hillerman, 109 Cal. App. 3d 334, 339, 167 Cal. Rptr. 240, 242 (1980).
57. A "quarter" is the basic unit of social security coverage, consisting of a quarter of a
calendar year of employment or its designated equivalent. 20 C.F.R. § 404.140 (1982). See
In re Marriage of Kelley, 64 Cal. App. 3d at 97, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 267, citing 1974 Social
Security and Medicare Explained (CCH) §§ 504-506.
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determine the quantum of his benefits.158 A number of variables, in-
cluding the marital status of the beneficiary, affect the total benefits
received by the primary beneficiary and the derivative or family
beneficiaries.
59
Division of Future Benoits." The California Cases
The United States Supreme Court has never considered whether
the right to future social security benefits may be divided in accordance
with state law, as it has with the right to future railroad retirement60
and military retirement benefits.61 However, the treatment by lower
state courts of the division of future social security benefits provides
some assistance in the analysis of the propriety of state division of re-
ceived social security benefits.
A number of California cases have dealt with the division of the
right to future social security benefits; four representative cases will be
discussed here: In re Marriage of Hillerman, In re Marriage of Cohen,
In re Marriage of Nizenkoff, and In re Marriage of Kelley.62 These
decisions have all concluded that the right to future63 social security64
58. In re Marriage of Kelley, 64 Cal. App. 3d at 97, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 268.
59. Id. at 97-98, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 268.
60. See supra notes 24-32 & accompanying text.
61. See infra text accompanying notes 92-102.
62. See supra note 4. See generaly Reppy, Communily and Separate Interests, supra
note 7, at 498-508. Dictum in In re Marriage of Sommers, 53 Cal. App. 3d 509, 515, 126 Cal.
Rptr. 220, 224 (1975), states that "social security ... benefits ... are properly the concern
of courts upon the severance of the marital relationship." However, Franklin Life Ins. Co.
v. Kitchens, 249 Cal. App. 2d 623, 629, 57 Cal. Rptr. 652, 656 (1967), the case cited by the
Sommers court in support of its statement, did not address issues relating to the subjection
of social security to state law; it merely mentioned it as one of a number of examples of
property interests that pose difficult division problems for today's courts. Kitchens does not
support the apparent conclusion that social security benefits are divisible under state marital
property laws.
In Allen v. Samuels, 204 Cal. App. 2d 710, 712, 22 Cal. Rptr. 528, 529 (1962), money
received as social security benefits was assumed without discussion to be community prop-
erty by the court in classifying a piece of property in which that money had been invested.
A similar assumption that social security benefits were community property was made with-
out discussion in Wisely v. Wisely, 178 Cal. App. 2d 181, 183, 2 Cal. Rptr. 886, 887 (1960).
One early commentator suggested that social security benefits be considered analogous to
insurance purchases; that is, insofar as they are purchased with community funds, the pro-
ceeds would belong to the community. Comment, Interest of the Wife Upon Dissolution of
the Community by Divorce in the OldAge Benfits Being Received by the Husband under the
Social Security Act, 15 S. CAL. L. REv. 226 (1942).
63. There is one Michigan case supporting the division of received social security bene-
fits, but a lack of significant analysis makes it unreliable as a predictor of the federal courts'
likely ruling on this issue. In Evans v. Evans, 98 Mich. App. 328, 296 N.W.2d 248 (1980),
the court held that received social security benefits were part of the "marital estate" for
purposes of property division. The court conceded that Hisquierdo would "presumably"
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benefits65 cannot be divided 66 as community property upon divorce.
All four decisions are based in part upon the preemption of state law
under the supremacy clause; three67 of the four decisions also rely on
the absence of a contractual right to or a property interest in social
security benefits.
68
preclude division of expected future benefits, but stated that "[i]n the instant case, the con-
tested social security benefits were acquired during the marriage. The amount of benefits is
currently ascertainable-$S8,279. This is not a case where the court has divided some future,
possible benefit, but is merely the parceling of a presently existing bank account comprised
partially of worker's compensation and social security benefits." Id at 331, 296 N.W.2d at
250. The decision does not clarify whether the social security benefits at issue were old age
or disability benefits. See infra note 64.
Another court, while holding that a wife could not share in her husband's future social
security benefits, recognized the distinction between future benefits and "benefits which had
not only vested but for which payments had actually been made to husband, a totally differ-
ent situation .... " Wisner v. Wisner, 129 Ariz. 333, 339 n.4, 631 P.2d 115, 121 n.4 (1981),
distinguishing Guerrero v. Guerrero, 18 Ariz. App. 400, 502 P.2d 1077 (1972).
64. The four California cases under discussion all involved old age benefits, which es-
sentially function as a retirement pension. An Arizona case concluded that received social
security disability benefits are community property. Guerrero v. Guerrero, 18 Ariz. App.
400, 402, 502 P.2d 1077, 1079 (1972); see Reppy, Community and Separate Interests, supra
note 7, at 536 n.427. Both types of benefits are part of OASDI, and a worker is insured for
both by virtue of duration of "covered" employment. See supra text accompanying note 57.
Because the purposes of a disability and a retirement system are quite different, the
Guerrero precedent is diminished in importance for this analysis. Insofar as disability pay-
ments take the place of wages, they are seen as community property. Guerrero v. Guerrero,
18 Ariz. App. at 402, 502 P.2d at 1079; Inre Marriage of Stenquist, 21 Cal. 3d 779, 791, 582
P.2d 96, 103, 148 Cal. Rptr. 9, 16 (1978). Insofar as they are compensation for injuries, they
should be considered equivalent to tort judgments. Distribution of tort recoveries by one
spouse has raised difficult policy questions for courts and legislatures. See, e.g., CAL. CIv.
CODE § 4800(c) (West Supp. 1981); H. VERRALL, supra note 8, at 300-05; W. REPPY, supra
note 39, at 145-48.
65. The Kelley case refers also to distribution of OASDI "contributions," the amounts
of FICA tax paid by the employee. 64 Cal. App. 3d at 96, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 267. The court
had apparently considered, but rejected, reimbursement to the community of FICA contri-
butions as an alternative to division of future benefits. See Reppy, Community and Separate
Interests, supra note 7, at 535-36.
66. See generally Martin, Social Security Beneftsfor Spouses, 63 CORNELL L. REv. 789,
833-36 (1978).
67. In re Marriage of Cohen, 105 Cal. App. 3d 836, 164 Cal. Rptr. 672 (1980); In re
Marriage of Nizenkoff, 65 Cal. App. 3d 136, 135 Cal. Rptr. 189 (1977); In re Marriage of
Kelley, 64 Cal. App. 3d 82, 134 Cal. Rptr. 259 (1976). The Cohen decision relies primarily
upon an anti-attachment argument, see infra text accompanying notes 82-86, but also dis-
cusses the absence-of-right argument made in Kelley and Nizenkoff.
68. This latter argument has its basis in Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1963), in
which the United States Supreme Court upheld as constitutional a statute which terminated
social security benefits payable to an alien deported for specified reasons. This statute, the
Court held, did not deprive the plaintiff of an "accrued property right." Id. at 610. "[A]
person covered by the Act," concluded the Court, "has not such a right in benefit payments
as would make every defeasance of 'accrued' interests violative of the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment." Id. at 611. Importantly, the Court followed this conclusion with the
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Two of the four California cases holding that federal law preempts
division of the right to future social security benefits in accordance with
community property principles do so on the basis of general conffict
between state and federal law. In re Marriage of Kelley69 referred to
the specific benefits provided in the social security statutes for wives,
divorced wives, widows, and surviving divorced wives.70 It concluded
critical caveat that Congress is not therefore "free of all constitutional restraint" in modify-
ing the statutory scheme; an employee covered by the Act is entitled to due process as pro-
tection against arbitrary governmental action. Id
Due process protection means that although the government can "unilaterally repudiate
the right" of a category of recipients, In re Marriage of Nizenkoff, 65 Cal. App. 3d at 138,
135 Cal. Rptr. at 190, it cannot deprive individual recipients of benefits without according
them due process because their property interest is of "sufficient substance" to warrant that
protection. Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. at 611. Therefore, Flemming . Nestor limits the
scope of the individual's interest in social security; it does not destroy it completely. It does
not follow that because a governmentally granted benefit is statutorily subject to defeasance
it loses its character as property or potential property-an earned expectancy, in Professor
Reppy's lexicon. Reppy, Community and Separate Interests, supra note 7, at 439-43. As one
California court concluded, "The fact that Congress, in its discretion, may withdraw benefits
at any time has no impact on the state's ability to characterize them for its own purposes
under local principles of property law." In re Marriage of Hillerman, 109 Cal. App. 3d at
340, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 243, (citing In re Marriage of Fithian, 10 Cal. 3d 592, 517 P.2d 449,
111 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1974)); accordIn re Marriage of Karlin, 24 Cal. App. 3d 25, 29-31, 101
Cal. Rptr. 240, 242-44 (1972) (military retired pay). Furthermore, a clause in the Social
Security Act expressly reserves to Congress "[t]he right to alter, amend, or repeal any provi-
sion" of the Act. 42 U.S.C. § 1304 (1976). That clause offers necessary flexibility in the
management of the program.
The Railroad Retirement Act does not include such a reservation of power to amend or
repeal, but case law suggests such a power exists. See Reppy, Community and Separate
Interests, supra note 7, at 497 n.282. In Hisquierdo, the court analogized to the reservation
of this power in the Social Security Act. 439 U.S. at 575 & n.6. The military retired pay
statutes do not include such a provision. However, "the Ninth Circuit recently rejected the
argument that Congress' alteration of the method by which retired pay is calculated de-
prived retired military personnel of property without due process of law." Costello v. United
States, 587 F.2d 424, 426 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 929 (1979); see also McCarty
v. McCarty, 453 U.S. at 223 n.15. Neither McCarty nor Hisquierdo referred to congressional
power to modify retirement benefits to support their preemption conclusions.
69. 64 Cal. App. 3d 82, 134 Cal.Rptr. 259 (1976).
70. Before 1965, a divorced woman was entitled to derivative benefits only if she was
the mother of the beneficiary's child. 42 U.S.C. § 416(d), amended by Pub. L. No. 85-840,
§ 301(e), 72 Stat. 1028 (1958). The Act was then amended to provide for ex-wives of benefi-
ciaries who had been married to the beneficiary for at least twenty years. Social Security Act
of 1937, amended by Pub. L. No. 89-97, § 308(c), 79 Stat. 377 (1965). In 1977 the length of
the marriage to qualify under this provision was reduced to 10 years. 42 U.S.C. § 416(d)
(1976 & Supp. IV 1980), amended by Pub. L. No. 95-216, § 337(a), 91 Stat. 1548 (1977).
The statute does not provide for ex-husbands. Gender-based distinctions in other sec-
tions of the Social Security Act have been held unconstitutional. Califano v. Goldfarb, 430
U.S. 199 (1977) (widowers, but not widows, required to prove actual support to receive de-
pendent benefits); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975) (benefits provided for
mothers but not fathers). A similar challenge on behalf of an otherwise qualifying ex-hus-
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that "[i]f all or any part of OASDI contributions or benefits are in-
cluded in the mix of community property divisible on dissolution of
marriage, what is a uniform federal scheme of benefits becomes one
that varies depending upon the community property law of various
states.",71
The court in In re Marriage of Nizenkoff72 more fully analyzed the
problem. Referring to the specific amendments to the Social Security
Act providing for divorced wives, the court stated that because "Con-
gress expressly provided for the interests of a divorced wife in the social
security system, it did not intend that they [sic] rely on state family law
concepts of support, alimony and community property. '7 3  The
Nizenkoff court found the necessary interference with the social secur-
ity system in the mere existence of the provision for ex-spouses, con-
cluding that "[a] ruling that social security benefits are divisible
community assets would seriously interfere with the express statutory
scheme of the Social Security Act. . . ,,74 Yet Nizenkoff does not ex-
plain, nor do the other cited cases, why the specific provision made for
divorced wives of ten-year marriages precludes the states from apply-
ing their marital property laws to afford additional protection to these
women.
In re Marriage of Hillerman75 analyzed the preemption issue in
band would most likely succeed. See In re Marriage of Nizenkoff, 65 Cal. App. 3d at 140
n.8, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 191 n.8.
71. In re Marriage of Kelley, 64 Cal. App. 3d at 99, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 268. Although
the language could be construed to cover received benefits, the issue before the court was
clearly limited to future benefits. Id at 86, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 261.
The Kelley decision also stressed that social security is "primarily . . .federal social
insurance," id at 98, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 268, rather than "deferred compensation for past
labor." Id It bases this conclusion largely on the benefit scheme, in which benefits may
bear little relationship to contributions, especially because of the additional benefits avail-
able to spouses and ex-spouses.
Of course, private pension plans also may pay out different amounts to beneficiaries
depending on their marital and dependency status. Is the court suggesting social security is
a gift from the government and thus must be classified as gifts would be in a state marital
property system? Such an argument is untenable. Even though benefits are not directly
related to contributions, it is clear that the only way to qualify to receive benefits is through
employment. The legislative history supports the conclusion that for purposes of state mari-
tal property law social security is an onerous, not a donative, acquisition. See statement by
Senator George, Chairman of the United States Senate Finance Committee when the Social
Security Act was passed, quoted in Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. at 623 (Black, J.,
dissenting).
72. 65 Cal. App. 3d 136, 135 Cal. Rptr. 189 (1977).
73. Id at 140, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 191.
74. Id at 141, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 192.
75. 109 Cal. App. 3d 334, 167 Cal. Rptr. 240 (1980).
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greater depth. Citing authority relied upon in Hisquierdo,76 the court
referred to the need to find a "'clear and manifest' purpose of Con-
gress"' 77 to oust state law, and "an 'actual conflict' between the state and
federal law. . . which does 'major damage' to the 'clear and substan-
tial' governmental interests involved in the federal scheme." 78 The
family benefit scheme of OASDI, the court explained, "suggest[s] to us
the presence of a. . .congressional intent to replace state family law as
it applies to Social Security. ' 79 The Hillerman court then posed vari-
ous hypothetical problems in defining community interests of husbands
and wives in Old Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI)
benefits.8 0  Resulting complications and absurdities led the court to
conclude that Congress must have intended to designate OASDI bene-
ficiaries exclusive of any state domestic law.8'
In re Marriage of Cohen8 2 reviewed the Kelley and Nizenkoff deci-
sions, merely reiterating their rationale on the preemption issue. More
important to the court, though, was the Hisquierdo decision, which fol-
lowed Kelley and Nizenkoff, and its emphasis on the anti-attachment
76. United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 352 (1966); Wetmore v. Markoe, 196 U.S. 68,
77 (1904).
77. 109 Cal. App. 3d at 341, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 244.
78. Id at 342, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 244 (citations omitted).
79. Id at 343, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 245.
80. Some of the problems posed were: Would the right to the benefits be based upon
the marital status of the primary beneficiary throughout his or her total years of covered
employment? Or would the right be determined solely on the basis of the final 10 years of
employment, upon which benefits are based? Id at 344, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 24546. See
Reppy, Community and Separate Interests, supra note 7, at 527-40, for a discussion of reme-
dial problems in division of OASDI benefits.
In addition, because of social welfare aspects of the statutory scheme, social security
benefits would be more complex to divide than private pension benefits. Private pension
benefits car, however, pose very difficult problems of division. See generally Bruch, supra
note 21, at 851 & n.332; DiFranza & Parkyn, Dividing Pensions on Marital Dissolution, 55
CAL. ST. B.J. 464 (1980); Hardie, Pay Now or Later: Alternatives in the Disposition of Retire-
ment Bene6ts on Divorce, 53 CAL. ST. B.J. 106 (1978); Hardie & Reisman, Employee Benefit
Plans and Divorce: Type o/Plan, Date ofRetirement, and Income Tax Consequences as Fac-
tors in Dispositions, 5 COMM. PROP. J. 179 (1978); Johnson & Jones, How Community Prop-
erty Laws Affect Employee Benefit Plans, 3 COMM. PROP. J. 3 (1976).
81. In re Marriage of Hillerman, 109 Cal. App. 3d at 344, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 245. A
problem preliminary to dividing either future or received benefits is establishing that they
are the fruits of the employed spouse's labor during marriage. If the couple was married
throughout the working life of the employed spouse, and benefits are already being received,
there is no problem. But difficult apportionment problems arise when the employee was
married for only part of his or her working life, or if the employee continues to work after
divorce, For a lengthy discussion see Reppy, Community and Separate Interests, supra note
7, at 529-40; see also In re Marriage of Hillerman, 109 Cal. App. 3d at 341, 167 Cal. Rptr. at
243.
82. 105 Cal. App. 3d 836, 164 Cal. Rptr. 672 (1980).
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clause of the Railroad Retirement Act.83 Referring to the Social Secur-
ity Act's anti-attachment clause, section 407,84 the Cohen court con-
cluded that "[t]he rationale supporting the federal Hisquierdo decision
appears equally applicable to social security benefits ...."85
None of the other three California social security cases even men-
tioned section 407 as a barrier to state law division of benefits, even
though it is a serious obstacle to all state court division of future social
security benefits. However, the case law indicates that section 407
would preclude state law division of received benefits--"moneys paid,"
in statutory terminology--only to the extent they are held in a form
that is "readily withdrawable" and that retains the quality of money.
86
83. Id at 842, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 675.
84. See supra note 35.
85. 105 Cal. App. 3d at 842-43, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 676.
86. See supra text accompanying notes 35-43. The briefs of counsel in these cases do
not reflect the potentially determinative impact of section 407. Neither party in In re Mar-
riage of Kelley, 64 Cal. App. 3d 82, 134 Cal. Rptr. 259 (1976), even referred to the section.
Theodore Nizenkoff, desiring a share in his wife's future social security benefits, argued
that he was a co-owner, not a creditor, and that § 407, which he quoted, would therefore not
bar the desired relief. He tried to distinguish Philpott v. Essex County Welfare Board, 409
U.S. 413 (1973), without success. Brief for Appellant, at 13-14, In re Marriage of Nizenkoff,
65 Cal. App. 3d 136, 135 Cal. Rptr. 189 (1977). In her brief, Desi Marie Nizenkoff never
mentioned § 407, thus ignoring what could have been a strong argument. Instead, she ar-
gued that future social security benefits are not "property" subject to division, citing Flem-
ming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1963), and that the provision made in the statute for divorced
spouses manifested congressional intent not to subject social security benefits to disposition
under state marital property laws. Brief for Respondent at 3-8.
After In re Marriage of Hillerman, 109 Cal. App. 3d 334, 167 Cal. Rptr. 240 (1980), was
retransferred for consideration in light of Hisquierdo, see supra note 4, the parties filed sup-
plemental briefs. Tyna Hillerman's brief began by recognizing that the Hisquierdo decision
"placed considerable emphasis on the anti-attachment and anti-anticipation clause con-
tained in § 231m of the Railroad Retirement Act ...." Second Supplemental Brief for
Appellant, at 4. However, she continued, "[iut must be noted that unlike the Railroad Re-
tirement Act, the Social Security Act does not contain an anti-anticipation clause. Secondly,
while both the Social Security Act and the Railroad Retirement Act contain an anti-assign-
ment clause, the congressional purpose underlying the Railroad Retirement Act's anti-as-
signment clause differs substantially from that of the Social Security Act." Id Thus, she
argued, § 231m was intended to encourage retirement, whereas the Social Security Act's
objectives were quite different. She concluded that Hisquierdo's reasoning and result were
"not applicable to the anti-assignment clause contained in the Social Security Act." Id at 5.
She never referred specifically to § 407, and never dealt with its exemption of benefits from
"legal process."
The briefs in In re Marriage of Cohen, 105 Cal. App. 3d 836, 164 Cal. Rptr. 672
(1980), dealt directly with § 407. Petitioner Sheila Cohen attempted to distinguish § 407
from section § 23 1m of the Railroad Retirement Act, but only on the basis that the former
lacks the anti-anticipation language of the latter. She argued that the court was free to
award her a monetary benefit based on the expected value of Philip's future social security
benefits or, in the alternative, to order Philip to pay her an appropriate share of those bene-
fits when received. Brief for Appellant, at 16-17. Surprisingly, Philip Cohen's brief failed to
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Probable United States Supreme Court Treatment of Received Social Security
Benefts
In light of Hisquierdo and McCarty, it seems likely that the United
States Supreme Court would adopt the position of the California cases
and conclude that state division of future social security benefits is pre-
empted by federal law. But the arguments supporting the preemption
result may not apply to received benefits possessed at the time of
divorce.
The more cogent of the two arguments of the California cases for
preemption in regard to future benefits, that exclusive provision was
made for divorced wives in the Social Security Act,87 is factually inap-
plicable to division of received benefits. It is possible to infer that the
specific provision 88 for divorced wives was meant to be exclusive, oust-
ing the states of the authority otherwise to divide the right to future
benefits upon divorce. But this statutory provision implies nothing
about the division of existing marital assets, even if they are traceable
to social security payments.8 9
Furthermore, there is a serious practical obstacle to assuring that
all received benefits on hand at divorce go to the beneficiary spouse.
To reach this result, the state courts, at the time of divorce, would need
to engage in extensive tracing to untangle the social security funds from
other marital property with which they may have been commingled.
To untangle "federal" from "state" divisible assets would require con-
fronting all the situations that have vexed the courts in community
property states in dividing separate from community property. For ex-
ample, courts would need to determine whether increases in asset value
are assignable to the investment of social security dollars or of other
capital, or to the labor applied to the capital investment.90
Because disentanglement would be required by federal command,
some sort of "federal common law" tracing would be preferable to fifty
different state systems. However, the decisions would be made by state
point out that section 407 refers to "moneys paid" and exempts social security from all
"legal process." Brief for Respondent at 8-10.
The limited advocacy in these cases directed to the potentially great impact of § 407
could in part explain the courts' limited reliance on that section.
87. See supra text accompanying notes 69-74.
88. 42 U.S.C. § 402(b)(1)(c) (1976). See supra note 5.
89. Professor Reppy concludes that state law principles would apply to benefits on
hand. Reppy, Community and Separate Interests, supra note 7, at 528.
90. Cf. Beam v. Bank of America, 6 Cal. 3d 12, 490 P.2d 257, 98 Cal. Rptr. 137 (1971);
Pereira v. Pereira, 156 Cal. 1, 103 P. 488 (1909); Van Camp v. Van Camp, 53 Cal. App. 17,
199 P. 885 (1921).
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trial courts, and federal appellate supervision would be unlikely. Each
state, if prevented from dividing received benefits in accordance with
its marital property law, would need to develop law to untangle those
benefits from other marital property,91 resulting in different enforce-
ment of the federal law from state to state.
Concern for the practicalities of division was a second reason that
the Nizenkoff court held that future benefits could not be divided in
accordance with state marital property principles. The "complexity"
rationale for preemption, however, cannot be applied to the issue of
received benefits. Whether the state divides those benefits along with
the other marital property in accordance with state principles, or dis-
tributes them to the beneficiary spouse, it must tackle the problem of
assets of mixed origin. Congress could not have meant, solely by
adopting the family benefit provisions, to impose this additional task of
isolating federal property on the state courts without offering any gui-
dance as to how it should be accomplished.
Although the social security cases may offer convincing arguments
for precluding state law division of future benefits, their rationale is not
convincing in relation to received benefits. The social security anti-
attachment provision, however, would prevent state division of re-
ceived benefits held in a readily withdrawable form, including, for ex-
ample, uncommingled bank accounts in the social security recipient's
name. The theoretical right to a division under state-marital property
law of assets traceable to social security, therefore, will be worth more
or less to any particular spouse of a social security beneficiary depend-
ing upon the form in which the assets are held.
Military Retired Pay: McCarty . McCarty
The existing system of military nondisability retired pay, funded
solely by congressional appropriations, was adopted for a number of
reasons relating to military personnel management. These include en-
couragement of retirement by officers no longer fit for wartime service,
inducement of enlistments and reenlistments, and provision of income
for persons who served in the armed forces.92 Receipt of military re-
tired pay terminates at the death of the service member; payments ow-
91. Noting that "federal preemption of marital property principles is disfavored," Pro-
fessor Reppy suggests "[olne reason for the Court's hesitancy to find that an Act of Congress
preempts state marital property law is the absence of a developed federal system to fill the
void created if state law is not applied." Reppy, Community and Separate Interests, supra
note 7, at 483-84, 508-09.
92. McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210, 212-15 (1981).
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ing at that time are made to the member's designated beneficiary. 93 No
spousal benefits are included in the plan.94 The military member may
elect to participate in a plan in which the amount of retired pay is re-
duced to fund an annuity payable at his or her death to a surviving
spouse or child.95
The Supreme Court prohibited state court division of future re-
ceipt of military retired pay in McCarty v. McCarty.9 6 While citing
extensively .from Hisquierdo for the principles underlying federal pre-
emption of state family law, the McCarty Court in fact applied a less
stringent test for preemption. 97 Instead of a direct enactment of a posi-
tive requirement that state law yield to federal law, the McCarty Court
required only that the state law conflict with the express terms of the
federal law, appearing to omit the need to find any direct indication of
a Congressional desire to preempt state law.98 And it required only
that the consequences of applying state law sufficiently injure federal
objectives to require nonrecognition rather than conditioning preemp-
tion upon a finding that continued application of state law would do
major damage to clear and substantial federal interests. 99 Whereas the
Hisquierdo analysis was specific and focused primarily on section
231m, the anti-attachment clause of the Railroad Retirement Act,'00
the McCarty Court's main theme was the general one that military re-
tired pay is the personal entitlement of the service member. The basis
for the Court's focus was 10 U.S.C. § 3929, which broadly states: "A
member of the Army retired under this chapter is entitled to retired pay
"101
93. Id at 215.
94. Id at 224. But see infra text accompanying notes 103-07.
95. The Retired Serviceman's Family Protection Plan and the Survivor Benefit Plan
are described in McCarty, 453 U.S. at 215-16.
96. 453 U.S. 210 (1981).
97. Id at 220-21 (citing Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. at 583). The Court in
McCarty chose to focus on the second formulation of the test in the Hisquierdo opinion, 439
U.S. at 583, neglecting the earlier formulation, 439 U.S. at 581. It is not the purpose of this
Article to offer a critique of McCarty or Hisquierd; dissenting opinions do so in both cases.
The McCarty dissent is particularly effective in pointing out difficulties in the majority opin-
ion. See also Reppy, Community and Separate Interests, supra note 7; Young, Supreme Court
Report, 65 A.B.A. J. 448, 452-53 (1979); Note, Community Property-Benefits Awarded Under
the Railroad Retirement Act Are Not Community Property Subject to Division upon Divorce,
I 1 ST. MARY'S L.J. 535 (1979).
98. 453 U.S. at 221.
99. Id. at 221.
100. See supra notes 30-31 & accompanying text.
101. 453 U.S. at 224. The Court refers to the Army's retirement system as typical,
"[slince each of the military services has substantially the same nondisability retirement sys-
tem." Id at 213. The centrality of the "personal entitlement" concept was predicted in
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The Court found further support for the centrality of the "personal
entitlement" concept to the military retired pay scheme in the mem-
ber's right to name a beneficiary other than a spouse to receive any
unpaid arrearages of the retired pay upon the member's death, in the
lack of any legislative provision for a retired service member's spouse,
and in the exclusive right of the service member to choose to participate
in survivor annuity plans. Further, it relied upon the anti-attachment
provisions of the law governing military retired pay. 1
0 2
Legislative Repudiation of McCarty
The United States Congress adopted the Uniformed Services For-
mer Spouses' Protection Act 10 3 on August 16, 1982, in direct response
to the McCarty holding. This new statute allows state courts to treat
military retired pay in accordance with state marital property law.
0 4
This abrogation of federal preemption becomes effective February 1,
1983.105 The right to receive pension benefits of all military couples
who divorce in the future will be subject to disposition under state
law.10 6 Although Congress appears to have intended a complete repu-
diation of McCarty, it did not fully accomplish that result. Because the
state courts have disposition power only over retired pay which is paya-
ble to a service member for pay periods beginning after June 25,
1981,107 the date of the McCarty decision, the status of military retired
pay that was received prior to that date, and that is still available for
disposition among the assets of couples who divorce in the future, is not
specifically clarified by the statute. The classification of such assets will
need to be determined with reference to the McCarty decision.
Application of McCarty to Received Benefits
The McCarty preemption analysis may well apply to received as
Goldberg, Is Armed Services Retired Pay Really Community Property? 48 CAL. ST. B.J. 12
(1973).
102. 453 U.S. at 224-30.
103. Former Spouses' Act, supra note 6.
104. The Former Spouses' Act, supra note 6, § 1002(c) provides in pertinent part as fol-
lows: "[A] court may treat disposable retired or retainer pay payable to a member for pay
periods beginning after June 25, 1981, either as property solely of the member or as property
of the member and his spouse in accordance with the law of the jurisdiction of such court."
105. Pub. L. No. 97-252, § 1006, 96 Stat. 730, 737 (1982).
106. The statute also provides other benefits to former spouses, such as the right to be
the beneficiary of an annuity under the Survivor Benefit Plan, id § 1008, 96 Stat. 730, 735,
and medical benefits and commissary and post exchange privileges (limited to former
spouses of marriages of 20 years' duration), id §§ 1004-05, 96 Stat. 730, 737.
107. See supra note 104.
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well as future benefits. First, unlike the Hisquierdo Court, which fo-
cused its opinion clearly on the "expectation of ultimately receiving
benefits,"' 08 the McCarty Court ambiguously stated the issue before it
more broadly as whether "federal law precludes a state court from di-
viding military nondisability retired pay pursuant to state community
property laws."l 09 Second, the Court itself recognized that the sweep of
its opinion may have required preemption of division of military pay in
all its aspects, including active duty pay.110 Third, the Court's analyti-
cal base, the statutory term "personal entitlement,"' is so broad that it
allows no escape from the preemption result. Undoubtedly any divi-
sion of any funds derived from or traceable to military retired pay,
resulting in their diversion from the service member to his or her ex-
spouse, detracts from the member's "personal entitlement." Conse-
quently, changing the facts of the case to question the division of re-
ceived rather than future retired pay would not likely have changed the
result.
Some counterarguments would be available. The indicia of con-
gressional concern for personal entitlement are weaker in the context of
received than future benefits.112 For example, arguments concerning
the anti-attachment aspects of the military retired pay statutes are as
inapposite to benefits in hand as are the parallel arguments in His-
quierdo concerning Railroad Retirement Act benefits.' 13 Furthermore,
Supreme Court precedent indicates that although military pay cannot
108. Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. at 573.
109. McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. at 211.
110. The majority stated, "we do not decide today whether California may treat active
duty pay as community property." Id at 225 n.17; see id at 241 n.2 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
111. Id at 224, citing S. REP. No. 1480, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1968).
112. Several legislative changes relied upon in McCarty as support for the Court's pre-
emption analysis based upon "personal entitlement" are unimportant in the context of re-
ceived military retired pay.
The Court cited Congress' decision to subject federal benefits to legal process to enforce
child support and alimony obligations, but not to comply with property distribution decrees.
Id at 230. This statutory modification is irrelevant to received benefits to the extent that the
anti-attachment provisions are not an obstacle to state division of received military retired
pay. See supra text accompanying notes 35-43.
Congress, the Court noted, has authorized or recognized equitable distribution of the
right to future pension receipts under civil service and foreign service retirement laws, see
supra note 34, while failing to enact similar legislation concerning military retired pay, 453
U.S. at 230-33. These developments reflect congressional views concerning division of fu-
ture pension benefits, but not of benefits already received. The policy concerns can be sig-
nificantly different in regard to these two sets of issues, see supra text accompanying notes
49-52 & infra notes 119-24.
113. See supra text accompanying notes 35-43.
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"be attached so long as it [is] in the Government's hands,"' 4 once it
leaves the government's hands the protection apparently does not
apply. 1
15
If the McCarty Court found "a conflict between the terms of the
federal retirement statutes and the community property right"'" 6 to di-
vide received military retirement benefits simply because some terms of
the military retired pay statutes are contrary to principle s of equitable
division by community property or other states," 7 it would undoubt-
edly rule that any state control over military retired pay is pre-
empted." 18 There is a second prong to the preemption test, however, to
be considered: whether application of state law would "sufficiently in-
jure the objectives of the federal program to require nonrecogni-
tion."1 9 Admittedly, division of received military retirement benefits,
like division of received Railroad Retirement Act benefits, would
somewhat diminish the assets available to the retiree at divorce, thus
partially frustrating the objective of providing for the retired service
member. 20 However, as would be the case under Hisquierdo, it is un-
likely that the diminution would constitute the required "grave harm"
to this federal interest.'
2
1
The other stated congressional objective of the retired pay statute
is "meet[ing] the personnel management needs of the active military
forces."' 22 Division of received military retired pay at divorce will not
affect inducement to retire, because the persons affected have already
retired. The Court's argument based upon the inability of military per-
sonnel to choose their state of residence 23 is a cogent one, but only
when active duty personnel are under discussion. 2 4 Persons who have
military retired pay on hand at divorce are already retired from active
114. McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. at 229 (footnote omitted).
115. In re Marriage of Karlin, 24 Cal. App. 3d 25, 31, 101 Cal. Rptr. 240, 244 (1972),
overruled on other grounds, In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 544 P.2d 561, 126 Cal.
Rptr. 633 (1976).
116. McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. at 232.
117. See supra notes 14-15 & 17.
118. Under this mode of analysis it is difficult to distinguish active duty pay. See supra
text accompanying note 110. See also Comment, McCarty v. McCarty and Military Retired
Pay- Avoiding the Test/or Federal Preemption of State Community Property Law and the
Problem of Unconstitutional Taking, 16 U.S.F. L. REv. 377, 390 (1982).
119. McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. at 221 (quoting Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. at 583).
120. Id. at 233.
121. Id See supra text accompanying notes 48-52.
122. 453 U.S. at 232-33.
123. Id at 234.
124. This issue is directly relevant to the applicability of state marital property law to
active duty pay. See supra note 110. In practical terms it is extremely unlikely that very
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duty and are free to choose their place of residence. It is possible, al-
beit theoretical,1 25 that division may have considerably greater impact
on the stated objectives of enlistment and re-enlistment if military per-
sonnel believe that their level of retirement benefits would be dimin-
ished by a required division. But this argument lacks any weight in
light of the recent congressional action granting states authority to di-
vide all rights to retired pay. The conference committee report on the
new law specifically noted that "there is insufficient evidence to evalu-
ate the contention that returning to the states the authority to divide
military retired pay would have a detrimental impact on retention."'
126
The Court's approach to the preemption issue in McCarty points
to an application of the doctrine broad enough to encompass benefits
received before June 26, 1981, about which Congress has not spoken, as
well as future benefits, as to which the decision is no longer applicable.
Now that Congress has obviously determined that application of state
marital property law to military retired pay would not sufficiently in-
jure military objectives to require preemption, it would be ironic for
courts to continue to apply a preemption analysis reliant on a contrary
legislative belief. Congress' recent action in regard to military retired
pay' 27 evidences its recognition that maintaining rules contrary to state
law for federal benefit division conflicts with the generally accepted
norm of equitable division between divorcing spouses of assets earned
during marriage. 28 Congressional action, however, has not gone far
enough. Railroad retirement benefits are still not divisible,12 9 and the
divisibility of social security benefits depends upon the duration of
one's marriage. 130 Furthermore, the division of pension benefits from
these sources which are still on hand at the time of divorce remains
problematical. Under the current federal legislative scheme, the dispo-
sition of received assets from federal benefit plans may depend on the
ability to circumvent the preemption problem. The next section of this
Article examines some ways states may be able to divide such assets,
using California law as a basis for analysis.
many retired military personnel choose their state of residence on the basis of its marital
property laws.
125. The Court itself recognized that "the extent to which the military retirement system
actually accomplishes [personnel management] goals" is in question. 453 U.S. at 234 n.26.
126. Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference, Department of De-
fense Authorization Act, S.2248, 128 CONG. REc. H5966, H5999 (daily ed. Aug. 16, 1982).
127. Former Spouses' Act, supra note 6.
128. See supra notes 14-15 & 17.
129. Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572 (1979).
130. See supra note 5 & accompanying text.
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Alternative Bases for State Jurisdiction Over Received Benefits
Alternative arguments for the division of received pension bene-
fits, circumventing the preemption problem, may be based upon state
law. For example, the protected character of the assets in question may
have been modified under generally accepted principles of state prop-
erty and marital property law, making their division in accordance with
that law appropriate. Doctrines to be examined in this regard include
transmutation, gift, and presumptions from form of title.
Transmutation
In California, an "easy" transmutation state, 31 it may be possible
to demonstrate that the employee spouse beneficiary of federal pension
benefits has intentionally transmuted received benefit payments
32
from their form as nondivisible community property to true divisible
community property, subject to equal division upon divorce. Even re-
ceived benefits retaining the quality of money and in a readily with-
drawable form-nonassignablel 33-may be transmuted.
Transmutation may occur by contract, oral as well as written; by
gift; or by actions of a spouse that fall into neither category, as when
one spouse has told the other that the money received from, for exam-
ple, social security, would be "theirs" to enjoy.1 34 Although obtaining
convincing proof of oral transmutations will be difficult, some courts
have been easily satisfied by evidence merely of declarations that cer-
tain property is "ours."1 35
131. W. REPPY, supra note 39, at 39. Transmutation is the term used in community
property law to describe changes in the classification of marital property from separate to
community and vice versa by transactions, often quite informal, between husband and wife.
Id at 29.
132. These same arguments can be applied to demonstrate transmutation of the right to
receive future benefit payments as well. Id at 29; cf. Wren v. Wren, 100 Cal. 276, 34 P. 775
(1893) (transmutation of future earnings to separate property).
133. See supra text accompanying notes 35-43 & 86.
134. W. REPPY, supra note 39, at 29.
135. See Estate of Nelson, 224 Cal. App. 2d 138, 143, 36 Cal. Rptr. 352, 355 (1964);
Linville v. Linville, 132 Cal. App. 2d 800, 802, 283 P.2d 34, 35 (1955); Estate of Raphael, 91
Cal. App. 2d 931, 936, 206 P.2d 391, 394 (1949); Stice v. Stice, 81 Cal. App. 2d 792, 798, 185
P.2d 402, 406 (1947). Some courts have held that conduct without an oral agreement will
also effect a transmutation. See Lawatch v. Lawatch, 161 Cal. App. 2d 780, 790-91, 327
P.2d 603, 608 (1958) (joint tax returns filed with respect to income from separate property
effected a transmutation); Long v. Long, 88 Cal. App. 2d 544, 549, 199 P.2d 47, 50-51 (1948)
(home built with community funds on separate property lot effected a transmutation of the
lot). Contra, Bias v. Reed, 169 Cal. 33, 42-43, 145 P. 516, 519 (1914); In re Marriage of
Jafeman, 29 Cal. App. 3d 244, 258, 105 Cal. Rptr. 483, 492 (1972); Kenney v. Kenney, 128




The federal benefits in question are community property under
California law, 136 although federal preemption makes them
nondivisible, like separate property. Therefore, the courts will proba-
bly require evidence of donative intent by the employee spouse to con-
clude that a gift transmutation has occurred. Evidence that received
benefits from federal sources have regularly been used for community




Close examination should also be made of the form of title in
which pension receipts are held at the time of divorce. Although title
generally has not been considered a controlling classification in Cali-
fornia community property law,' 38 recent case law makes rebutting cer-
tain forms of shared ownership title at the time of dissolution very
difficult. 1
39
Joint tenancy title has long been considered to be an indication of
a couple's intent to hold property as true joint tenants with equal sepa-
rate property interests, 140 and many couples hold much of their wealth,
including both real estate and bank accounts,' 41 in joint tenancy form.
Rebuttal of the presumption that joint tenancy property is equally
owned separate property requires proof of a mutual agreement or un-
derstanding of the parties to the contrary.1
42
The California Supreme Court recently made clear in In re Mar-
136. See supra note 11.
137. This principle does not apply when the money received from federal sources was
required to be spent on necessities. In California, spouses have an obligation of mutual
support that requires use of separate property-and, by extension, nondiyisible community
property-to purchase necessities of life. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5132 (West Supp. 1981). Use of
federal pension benefits for necessities therefore would not demonstrate an intent to
transmute.
138. With few exceptions, "characterization of property as community or separate de-
pends not on the 'title'. . . but on the source of the acquisition." W. REPPY, supra note 39,
at 39.
139. See infra text accompanying notes 142-44.
140. Bruch, supra note 21, at 830 n.238.
141. A 1961 study showed that more than half of the real property deeds recorded in
California are to husbands or wives or both. Of these, 85% are held by husband and wife as
joint tenants. Mills, Community Joint Tenanc-4 Paradoxical Problem in Estate Adminis-
tration, 49 CAL. ST. B.J. 38, 40 n.3 (1974).
142. Socol v. King, 36 Cal. 2d 342, 345-47, 223 P.2d 627, 629 (1950); Tomaier v.
Tomaier, 23 Cal. 2d 754, 758-59, 146 P. 2d 905, 907 (1944); Schindler v. Schindler, 126 Cal.
App. 2d 597, 601-02, 272 P.2d 566, 568 (1954).
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riage of Lucas 143 that tracing would not rebut the presumption of equal
ownership arising from a joint tenancy title. 144 Tracing to a
nondivisible community property source such as a federal pension
should also be disallowed under the Lucas principle.
While joint tenancy property cannot be divided upon divorce in
California,145 when the joint tenancy is severed, the property will be
equally divided between the parties. 146 Therefore, when received fed-
eral benefits are held in joint tenancy, they should be equally divided
between the joint tenants (although not by a divorce court), thereby
achieving the same result as application of the California community
property law. In essence, received benefits that under federal law are
not subject to division may be considered as having been transmuted
by the parties into equally owned separate property because the bene-
fits, or assets purchased with them, were placed into a joint tenancy
title. 147
143. 27 Cal. 3d 808, 614 P.2d 285, 166 Cal. Rptr. 853 (1980).
144. In Lucas, the Court refused to trace the contribution made from one spouse's sepa-
rate property. Id at 815, 614 P.2d at 288-89, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 857.
145. See Snyder v. Snyder, 134 Cal. App. 2d 445, 448, 286 P.2d 362, 364 (1955); Jenkins
v. Jenkins, 110 Cal. App. 2d 663, 665, 243 P.2d 79, 81 (1952).
146. A joint tenancy is by definition owned by the parties in equal shares. CAL. CIV.
CODE § 683 (West 1982). The joint tenancy can be severed by the unilateral act of either
spouse. Delanoy v. Delanoy, 216 Cal. 23, 26, 13 P.2d 513, 514 (1932); Gonzales v. Gonzales,
267 Cal. App. 2d 428, 435, 73 Cal. Rptr. 83, 87 (1968). A recent case permitted severance by
a deed in which the wife conveyed to herself an undivided one-half interest in the property
as tenant in common. Riddle v. Harmon, 102 Cal. App. 3d 524, 531, 162 Cal. Rptr. 530, 534
(1980).
147. Even though the Lucas principle may usefully be applied to avoid preemption in
certain situations, this author does not applaud its rationale. Brenda and Gerald Lucas took
title to residential real estate as "husband and wife as joint tenants." They were not allowed
to overcome the presumption arising from the form of title except "by evidence of an agree-
ment or understanding between the parties that the interests were to be otherwise" than as
stated in the title document. 27 Cal. 3d at 813, 614 P.2d at 287, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 856. Since
no such evidence existed, the down payment that Brenda Lucas made from her separate
property was given no credit; the property was equally divided between Brenda and Gerald.
The down payment had been $6,351.57; the loan had been reduced by approximately $2,348
by community property payments at the time of trial.
The presumption that arises in California from a joint tenancy title to residential real
estate at the time of divorce is not joint tenancy, but rather community property, by opera-
tion of law. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5110 (West Supp. 1982). The California Legislature created
this special presumption to allow divorce courts to award the family residence to a spouse
retaining custody of minor children; joint tenancy holdings, as separate property, are other-
wise not within the divorce court's jurisdiction. 1965 Cal. Stat. 1710.
The legislature recognized that husbands and wives "take property in joint tenancy
without legal counsel. . . they don't know what joint tenancy is .. " FINAL REPORT OF
CAL. ASSEMBLY INTERIM COMM. ON JUDICIARY RELATING TO DOMESTIC RELATIONS 1965
Sess. at 124 (cited in In re Marriage of Lucas, 27 Cal. 3d at 814, 614 P.2d at 288, 166 Cal.
Rptr. at 856.) Yet the court, while acknowledging the general ignorance of the implications
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A California court of appeal case, In re Marriage of
Cademartori,48 recently extended the Lucas holding to "all express
designations of ownership."' 149 The presumption arising from any
choice of title "could be overcome only by evidence of a common un-
derstanding or agreement."' 50 Therefore, using received federal bene-
fits from any source to purchase property in which title is taken in a
shared ownership form may result in a transmutation that will permit
the application of state law classification principles to property that
would otherwise not be divisible because of federal preemption.'
5'
The United States Supreme Court might view this result as a ruse
to avoid preemption and therefore reject it. However, this approach is
distinguishable from the California Supreme Court's attempt to avoid
preemption in In re Marriage of Milhan, 52 disapproved by the United
States Supreme Court in Hisquierdo.153 In Milhan, the California
Supreme Court would have given an undivided amount of community
assets to the nonemployee spouse equal to the value of the military
benefits to compensate for the nondivisible asset. This result in essence
would allow the nonemployee spouse to share indirectly the value of
the nondivisible asset.
In contrast, the recognition of a transmutation as described above
simply allows husband and wife to deal with the employee's federal
benefits as they see fit. By forbidding transmutations, which are recog-
of forms of title, makes the choice of a form of title of paramount importance. "It is the
affirmative act of specifying a form of ownership in the conveyance of title that removes
such property from the more general presumption [of community ownership, from which
one may trace back to separate property origins]. It is because of this express designation of
ownership that a greater showing is necessary to overcome the presumption arising there-
from than is necessary to overcome the more. general presumption that property acquired
during marriage is community property." 27 Cal. 3d at 814-15, 614 P.2d at 288, 166 Cal.
Rptr. at 857 (citation omitted).
Brenda Lucas' separate property contribution to the residence vanished into a joint
tenancy title, which was by operation of law a community property title upon divorce, be-
cause she and her husband had made no agreement to preserve her separate property inter-
est-even though couples admittedly are ignorant about the implications of title forms. For
more extensive discussion, see Bruch, supra note 21, at 789-94.
148. 119 Cal. App. 3d 970, 174 Cal. Rptr. 292 (1981).
149. Id at 976, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 295.
150. Id at 975, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 295.
151. Practitioners representing persons receiving federal benefits which could be distrib-
uted to the beneficiary spouse alone absent the presumption of transmutation arising from
taking a shared ownership title should advise theif clients of the potential negative impact of
that choice.
152. 13 Cal. 3d 129, 528 P.2d 1145, 117 Cal. Rptr. 809 (1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 976
(1975).
153. 439 U.S. at 588; see supra note 31 & accompanying text.
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nized by state law, the United States Supreme Court would be re-
straining voluntary alienation of the pension receipts, a suspect
result. 154
However, the United States Supreme Court's decision in Ridgway
v. Ridgway'"- is problematical. Richard Ridgway was a career Army
sergeant whose life was insured under the Servicemen's Group Life In-
surance Act (SGLIA). 156 Under this act, a military service member has
the right to designate and change the beneficiary of the insurance pol-
icy.' 57 When the couple was divorced, the state court's judgment, fol-
lowing property settlement negotiations,' 58 ordered Richard "'to keep
in force the life insurance policies on his life now outstanding for the
benefit of the parties' three children'."' 59 Four months following the
divorce, and after remarrying, Richard Ridgway changed the benefici-
ary clause so that its proceeds would be "paid as specified 'by law.' ",160
He died a year later, and both his first wife, on behalf of the children of
their marriage, and the second wife claimed the proceeds.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine ordered the superior court
to impose a constructive trust on the policy proceeds for the benefit of
the children. The United States Supreme Court reversed, finding that
the result was preempted by federal law. Ridgway's "absolute right to
designate the policy beneficiary"' 6' was cited to support the Court's
result. "It is not a shared asset subject to the interests of another, as is
community property."'' 62 Furthermore, the Court stated, the imposi-
tion of a constructive trust over the proceeds would be inconsistent with
the anti-attachment provision of the SGLIA. "We find nothing to indi-
cate that Congress intended to exempt claims based on property settle-
ment agreements from the strong language of the anti-attachment
154. See RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY, § 405, comment a (1944); cf. 6 POWELL, THE
LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 844 (P. Rohan ed. 1981).
155. 454 U.S. 46 (1981).
156. Id at 48. The SGLIA is described id. at 50-53.
157. An earlier case, Wissner v. Wissner, 338 U.S. 655 (1950), established that the serv-
ice member may designate and change beneficiaries free of any community property claims
of a spouse to a share in the policy proceeds.
158. The opinions are in conflict on the status of the divorce court's judgment in this
regard. The majority opinion stated that the divorce court judgment was "apparently fol-
lowing property settlement negotiations," 454 U.S. at 48; later in its discussion the majority
referred to "property settlement agreements." id at 61. Justice Powell, dissenting, stated
that the decree "incorporatfed] the agreement of the parties." Id at 66.
159. 454 U.S. at 48.
160. Id
161. Id at 59.




The Court's analysis in Ridgway focused on the power of the state
courts. It did not consider whether Richard Ridgway had the right to
agree, in a negotiated property settlement, to divest himself of some
indicia of ownership in this type of property. By implication, however,
the Supreme Court has essentially prevented someone like Ridgway
from making a binding agreement granting rights in this insurance to
his ex-spouse. Because the Court was concerned with the control over
the insurance proceeds by the courts rather than by the employee
spouse, the issue of the employee's right to transmute these types of
benefits-and the proof required to assure that the employee spouse
will be held to the transmutation-is not settled by this case. 164
The result in Ridgway of course diminishes the employee's interest
in this type of property. For example, such property will no longer be
useful in a divorce settlement, because a properly advised nonemployee
spouse would not accept a pledge that could be broken with impunity.
As a result, the employee spouse might be forced to purchase new in-
surance to meet property settlement demands.165
In sum, the spouse seeking to overcome federal preemption of
state division of certain federal benefits by transmutation or gift will
need to produce convincing evidence that may be especially trouble-
some to obtain. In contrast, the spouse seeking to overcome the pre-
emption result by showing that the received benefits are held in a
shared title form will have the presumptions and burdens in his or her
favor, and the employee spouse will need to prove the existence of an
agreement or understanding that the property was to retain its original
form. Because couples tend to take title to property in shared owner-
ship form, notwithstanding its classification in the absence of the title,
the Lucas and Cademartori decisions could have a significant impact in
returning assets preempted from division to their divisible community
status.
163. Id at 61.
164. Id at 63. The Former Spouses' Act includes a provision allowing a binding elec-
tion to provide an annuity under the military retired pay statutes to a former spouse. For-
mer Spouses' Act, supra note 6, § 1003(f)(1), 96 Stat. 730, 736 (1982).
165. 454 U.S. at 82 (Stevens, J., dissenting). It is of interest, but not discussed in the
opinion, that Richard Ridgway changed the beneficiary from April Ridgway, his first wife,
to a direction that the policy proceeds "be paid as specified 'by law'." Id at 48. Why did he
choose this designation instead of simply naming Donna Ridgway, his second wife? Might
Richard Ridgway have thought that under this designation the divorce court's decree was
part of the "law" in accordance with which the policy proceeds would be paid upon his
death?
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Conclusion
The decided cases prohibiting division between spouses of future
federal pension benefits do not foreclose the division of all assets re-
ceived as, or traceable to, such benefits. The anti-attachment clause in
the Railroad Retirement Act, section 231 M,' 66 might be read to pro-
hibit division of those received benefits maintained by the employee
spouse in a readily withdrawable form. However, such an interpreta-
tion requires an overly broad reading of the statute.
The anti-attachment clause of the Social Security Act,' 67 in con-
trast, is likely to prevent division between spouses of received benefits
held in a readily withdrawable form.168 The complexity of untangling
assets of mixed origin should convince the courts not to apply the pre-
emption doctrine to benefits received from social security that are held
other than in readily withdrawable form. The case law suggests that
division will depend on asset form at the time of divorce.
To the extent that the new legislation leaves open for some couples
the question of the reach of preemption in division of received military
retired pay, the McCarty precedent is still alive. The McCarty analysis
is so broad that it could encompass received as well as future benefits,
regardless of the form in which those benefits are held. The Court's
"personal entitlement" analysis has no logical endpoint. 69
State law doctrines of transmutation, gift and presumptions from
form of title might allow circumvention of the preemption result in par-
ticular cases. These avenues for avoiding preemption results are avail-
able in regard to received benefits as well as future benefits. 17
The preemption of state law division of assets and the entitlement
to their future receipt raise a serious social policy issue. In many mar-
riages the pension is the most valuable asset earned during the mar-
riage. Yet one spouse, usually the wife, has no right or only limited
right to future pension benefits and may have no right to benefits al-
ready received from that source. Congress' bold step to remedy this
problem for ex-spouses of military service members should be
repeated.
Railroad retirement and social security benefits should be fully
subject to division under state law, as will be all military retired pay
166. See supra note 30.
167. See supra note 35.
168. See supra text accompanying notes 35-43 & 83-86.
169. See supra text accompanying notes 108-18.
170. See supra text accompanying notes 131-65.
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under the new statute. 171 The duration of marriage requirement in the
Social Security Act 172 should be eliminated; equitable property division
should apply in brief as well as lengthy marriages.
The administrative burdens of responding to court orders for divi-
sion of pension benefits can be avoided in regard to social security, as
in the Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act, by retain-
ing a duration-of-marriage requirement solely as a prerequisite to di-
rect distribution of the benefits to an ex-spouse.173 With respect to the
social security system, complete elimination of federal preemption of
state marital property law should encourage Congress to give serious
consideration to restructuring the system so that covered quarters of
social security retirement credits are divided between spouses at the
time that they are earned. Then at the time of divorce no division
would be required.' 74
Legislators should recognize the potential difficulty of classifying
benefits received from federal pension plans. Legislation to eliminate
preemption in respect to future benefit distributions also needs to refer
to received benefits. The necessary provision could simply state, "Ben-
efits received under this plan before or after the effective date of this
amendment shall be treated by a court at the time of divorce as the
property of a pension recipient and his or her spouse in accordance
with the law of the jurisdiction of such court." The Uniformed Serv-
ices Former Spouses' Protection Act should be amended in this fash-
ion. 75 To eliminate the lottery-like impact of anti-attachment clauses,
under which classification and distribution may depend upon the form
in which received benefits are held at the time of divorce, 76 the provi-
sion should continue, "Notwithstanding any other provision of law, all
benefits received hereunder shall be subject to distribution in accord-
ance with the law of the jurisdiction of such court."
Since forty states have some form of equitable distribution of mar-
ital wealth,177 and eight others have community property systems,' 7
the recognition of joint spousal contribution to the family wealth at the
171. Former Spouses' Act, supra note 6, § 1006(c)(1), 96 Stat. 730 (1982).
172. See supra note 5.
173. See Former Spouses' Act, supra note 6, § 1002(d)(2), 96 Stat. 730, 732 (1982) (10
U.S.C. § 1408(d)(2)).
174. Leonard, The Three-Legged Stook Women and Retirement (In)Security, 32 HAs-
TiNGs L.J. 1195, 1218-19 (1981).
175. That Act should also be amended to assure that state law will be fully applicable to
the division of active duty pay on hand at divorce. See supra note 110.
176. See supra notes 35-43 & accompanying text.
177. See supra note 17.
178. See supra note 12.
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time of divorce is the clearly prevalent policy in this country. The fed-
eral government, which has deferred to the states on matters of family
law, should defer to this family law policy and conform all federal law
to the principles desired by the vast majority of the states and their
citizens.
